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In this essay I will reflect on the three cases decided by the
Supreme Court in the new millennium. Of course, there is
nothing sacrosanct about the year 2001, except that there was an
overblown scare about the breakdown of our computerized world.
That said, the three copyright cases decided in or after 2001 do
provide a picture, albeit somewhat blurred, of where the Court
stands on copyright issues.
Three cases, obviously, do not
constitute an enormous amount of empirical data, so I can only
posit tentative conclusions about where the Court is going and
what these decisions might mean for the future of copyright law.
On the whole, as I reflect on this rather limited Supreme
Court jurisprudence, I fail to conclusively find a unifying theme. I
would prefer to speak of certain tendencies, which may or may not
come to full fruition in the future. What I see in reviewing Eldred v.
1
2
Ashcroft, New York Times Co. v. Tasini, and Dastar v. Twentieth
3
Century Fox Film Corp. is a Court that rejects a clear-cut normative
vision in favor of what one might characterize as a jurisprudence of

† Distinguished Scholar in Intellectual Property Law and University Fellow
at Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington. B.A. and J.D. University of
Texas; M.A. University of Illinois, LL.M. New York University.
1. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
2. 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
3. 123 S. Ct. 2041 (2003).
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deference, a conservative orientation rather than an exercise of
some form of judicial activism. Relative unanimity rules the day
among members of the Court as exemplified by Eldred and Tasini in
their 7-2 opinions, finding Stevens and Breyer the dissenters in
4
each. It is a court that has reconfirmed the traditional contours of
copyright, one that recognizes the delicate balance between the
exclusive rights of the copyright owner and exceptions and
limitations on that property right. In this regard, certain public
domain advocates, who were sorely disappointed after the Court
upheld the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) in Eldred v.
Ashcroft, may be pleasantly surprised if and when the Court is asked
to accommodate digital issues within the traditional confines of
copyright. I will return to this issue throughout this essay.
In reviewing these cases, I reveal my own particular bias in
constitutional interpretation, which avoids a structured formalist or
originalist interpretation. Instead, I favor a more generalized
pragmatic, instrumentalist approach to the law and believe that the
ultimate goal of any constitutional jurisprudence is the
enhancement of social welfare, an important aspect of which is
consumer welfare, as defined from an economic standpoint. Of
course, this jurisprudence should always be constrained by the
language of statutes and the intent of Congress, particularly when
that intent unambiguously flows from the statutory provision.
However, statutes and constitutional provisions must be interpreted
flexibly in order to make them speak intelligently to circumstances
sometimes not envisaged by their drafters. In other words, the law
is not grounded in permanent principles and realized in logical
manipulation of these principles.
As for my own view on the three cases at issue, I find the
decisions to be sensible from a jurisprudential standpoint, although
I might find fault with the rationale of Dastar, rather than its
holding. I might disagree with the policy behind the CTEA, but
not the Eldred decision. Likewise, I am not happy with the
immediate societal effect of the Court’s Tasini decision, but I think
the Court properly interpreted the statute. I will begin with the
most talked about Supreme Court case affecting copyright law,
which is, of course, Eldred, decided on January 15, 2003.

4.

See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 223, 242; Tasini, 533 U.S. at 506.
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I. ELDRED V. ASHCROFT: DEFERENCE AND HUMILITY
5

Eldred v. Ashcroft is a significant case because it represents the
first direct challenge to the constitutionality of any portion of
federal copyright legislation to reach the Court since the first
statute became law in 1790. The fact that the Court decided to
hear the case on certiorari, after it was lost on both the district level
and on appeal, was a high point for public domain advocates.
The law was an impediment to Eric Eldred, who had hoped to
post a number of 1923 works on the Internet upon expiration of
6
their copyrights in 1999. The passage of the CTEA extended by
twenty years the copyright term for existing copyrights, pushing the
7
copyright expiration on these works to 2019. Eldred’s primary
argument was that the CTEA did not “promote science and useful
arts” as required by Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United
8
States Constitution. Rather the law was simply a windfall to owners
of existing copyrights, and neither encouraged the creation of new
9
works nor provided any other benefit to the public. Moreover, the
statute was said to violate Article I because an extension of existing
copyright terms would exceed congressional power to grant
10
copyright for “limited times.” Eldred also asserted a violation of
the First Amendment claiming that the CTEA was a content-neutral
regulation of speech that could be upheld only if it satisfied a
11
heightened level of judicial scrutiny. Both the district court and
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit summarily
12
rejected these arguments.
To the surprise of many, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
13
in February 2002. The case soon became front-page news around
the world and generated an unusually large number of amici briefs.
By a 7-2 vote, the Supreme Court upheld the CTEA that prolonged
the duration of existing and future copyrights for another twenty
14
years.
As a result of the decision, the term of copyright for
individual authors was extended to the life of the author plus
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

537 U.S. 186 (2003).
Joint Appendix at 13aa, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 2002 WL 32102971 (2002).
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 195.
Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 10, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 2001 WL 34092017 (2001).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 3-4.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1126 (2002).
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003).
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seventy years for works created on or after January 1, 1978. For
works first published before that date, the term is ninety-five years
16
from the date of first publication. Although the Supreme Court
decided against Eldred on both the Article I and First Amendment
issues, the Court’s rationale is worthy of attention for its possible
effect on future cases. I will begin by discussing the Article I issue
and then proceed to the First Amendment issue, which I believe
may prove to be the more significant issue in the future
development of copyright law.

A. The Article I Issue: Did the Extension Promote Progress?
One intriguing question was whether the Court would assume
17
the activist role that it took in federalist cases or take the more
deferential position that it has applied to commercial legislation.
Of course petitioners hoped that the Court would adopt its antifederalist role; in that case, the CTEA would be in serious difficulty.
At oral argument, when I heard Chief Justice Rehnquist speak with
enthusiasm about the expansive nature of Congress’s Commerce
Clause power, however, petitioner’s position was obviously in
jeopardy.
In deciding that Congress could apply a copyright extension to
existing copyrights, the Court acknowledged the influence of “an
unbroken congressional practice of granting to authors of works
18
with existing copyrights the benefit of term extensions” holding
that “[s]uch consistent congressional practice is entitled to ‘very
19
great weight . . . .’ ” This attitude is grounded on a basic principle
of constitutional interpretation. When Congress passes a law there
is an implicit congressional judgment that the statute is within
20
Congress’s constitutional power. Thus, the constitutional beliefs
15. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000).
16. Id. § 302(e). For works created before January 1, 1978 but not published
or copyrighted, the term of copyright “subsists from January 1, 1978, and endures
for the term provided by section 302.” Id. at § 303(a).
17. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 640-41 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S 44 (1996).
18. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 188.
19. Id. at 213.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 391 (1990)
(“Because Congress is bound by the Constitution, its enactment of any law is
predicated at least implicitly on a judgment that the law is constitutional.”).
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of Congress are a basic source for judicially constructed
constitutional law.
Indeed, even upon the most cursory reading, one is struck with
the language of an opinion permeated with the rhetoric of
deference. Having determined that the CTEA does not violate the
“limited Times” prescription of the “Copyright Clause,” the Court
goes on to state that “we defer substantially to Congress” on this
21
constitutional question. “[W]e are not at liberty to second-guess
congressional determinations and policy judgments of this order,
22
however debatable or arguably unwise they may be.” I surmised
that the petitioners may have been in trouble when Justice
O’Conner posed to the petitioners’ counsel, Lawrence Lessig, that
perhaps the term extension was bad policy, but was it
23
unconstitutional?
Indeed, the majority stated that the CTEA
“reflects judgments of a kind Congress typically makes, judgments
24
the Court cannot dismiss as outside the Legislature’s domain.”
Thus, deference to Congress is appropriate in this instance because
the kinds of judgments necessary to apply the relevant
constitutional rule either are better made by Congress or are
25
beyond the institutional competence of the Court. In the end,
the Court’s position markedly contrasts its cases based on
Congress’s power to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity. Instead,
the majority viewed the CTEA as another form of commercial
legislation.
I do not find the Court’s decision to defer to Congress’s
authority to make policy and opt for the status quo particularly
unanticipated, unusual, or striking. I say this even though I
disfavored lengthening the copyright term. Like so many others, I
was convinced that it could hardly enhance consumer welfare and
promote science and the useful arts by impoverishing the public
domain of thousands of works. My hunch is that the public’s ability
to freely access these works outweighs whatever incentive the
copyright monopoly might give to the copyright owner to distribute
the work. The Court, however, found it sufficient that Congress
“rationally credited projections that longer terms would encourage
copyright holders to invest in the restoration and public
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 222.
Id. at 188.
Id.
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distribution of their works.”
It is hard for me to fault the Court for deferring to Congress.
Evaluating the costs and benefits of term extension—that is, how to
promote science and the useful arts—is an appropriate
determination for Congress within its role as policy maker.
However, I am skeptical that the twenty-year extension will create
or save a significant number of jobs for our copyright industries. I
would like to see a study performed to determine the effect the
CTEA has on jobs; but even if one comes about, it might raise more
questions than it answers. It would be a worthwhile project, but I
suspect we will never know the full effects of the term extension
because such empirical determinations are inherently
indeterminate.
In short, Congress has wide latitude in determining what kind
of “progress” it is trying to promote when it passes copyright
legislation. The petitioners did not think that the CTEA was the
best way to promote progress, and I agree. As stated above,
however, one can just as easily argue that conferring more rights
will promote the distribution of works. In other words, term
extension may provide a useful subsidy for the efficient
management of property rights.
Ultimately, no universally
recognized definition of progress exists.
The meaning of
“progress” is inherently contingent. To adopt some fixed meaning
of “progress” would signal, at least in the copyright domain, a
return to a Lochnerian regime of economic substantive due
process that defined important aspects of constitutional law in the
27
first third of the twentieth century.
Looking farther out, what will happen in anticipation of 2019,
when the twenty-year extension will expire on the oldest currently
protected works? Will Congress provide another extension, a
CTEA II, substantiating the worst fears of those who believe the
1998 amendments are the first in a series leading to an ultimate
term of eternity minus one day? Or as one might express it:
28
“perpetual copyright term ‘on the installment plan’ ”? This was a
29
position taken by petitioners in Eldred. Their argument can be
characterized as follows: Once Congress has granted a term of
26. Id.
27. See Thomas B. Nachbar, Judicial Review and the Quest to Keep Copyright Pure,
2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 33, 67-68 (2003).
28. Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 9, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 2001 WL 34092017 (2001).
29. Id.
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copyright, Congress is prohibited from extending the term of
copyright. To do so would constitute a violation of the “limited
Times” provision of Article I. Of course, a twenty-year extension is
limited to twenty years. As William Patry explains, this logical
reality forced petitioners to argue the term extension was not
unconstitutional in itself but rather unconstitutional as one of an
30
infinite series of future extensions. Such arguments about the
future behavior of Congress carry little weight convincing a court to
31
strike down legislation.
I do not share the fears of many of my copyright colleagues
who believe that we have just seen the beginning of many
32
promiscuous term extensions.
I think the opposite.
My
prediction is that this will be the last extension, unless, of course
the European Union decides to extend their copyrights. If the
European Union would extend its copyright protection to, let’s say,
life plus ninety years, and the United States Congress followed suit,
I can see no rational basis for the Court to strike down such
legislation. Thus, the legislative problem may have to be solved by
legislative determination.
Actually, there is an elegant legislative solution to the
copyright term dilemma that I think would maximize consumer
welfare without, perhaps, unduly offending the needs of those who
advocate the extended term. As Justice Breyer noted in his dissent,
the Congressional Research Service study prepared for this case
indicates that only “2% of copyrights between 55 and 75 years old
33
retain commercial value.” Moreover, it is usually impracticable to
identify, much less find, authors of old works. And, of course, in
instances where one can do so, the transaction costs may be
prohibitive for creators of new intellectual property to acquire
34
licenses. To liberate those works that no longer have value to the
copyright owner, Congress should impose a copyright maintenance
35
fee every year up to the twentieth year of the extended term. One
30. William Patry, The United States and International Copyright Law: From Berne
to Eldred, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 749, 758 (2003).
31. See id.; William Patry, Court Takes Hands Off Approach on Copyrights, NEW
YORK L. J., May 12, 2003.
32. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Congress’s Power to Promote the Progress of
Science: Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 81-82 (Fall 2002) (discussing
unlimited extension of copyright duration under the CTEA).
33. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 248.
34. Id. at 250.
35. See Public Domain Enhancement Act, H.R. 2601, 108th Cong. § 3(c)
(2003); http://www.eldred.cc (a web site for the Public Domain Enhancement Act
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could even take a page from patent law and progressively increase
36
the maintenance fee every year until twenty years ends.
I believe this is the best congressional solution to the public
domain and one that is more feasible from a practical and political
standpoint than the solution that Landes and Posner propose:
infinitely renewable copyrights as measured from the beginning of
37
the copyright term.
The Landes and Posner plan would
necessarily entail the renegotiation of the TRIPS agreement and a
withdrawal from the Berne Convention, an unimaginably
intolerable price to pay in the creation of an economically efficient
system for managing copyright duration. A copyright maintenance
system as outlined above—one applied to the extended twenty-year
period only—while not a panacea to public domain publishers,
would avoid some of the deadweight loss that the term extension
has imposed on the market for copyrighted works. It would do so
without creating havoc with our international copyright relations.
What effect will the Court’s deferential attitude have on the
critical copyright issues of our day? Eldred does not bode well for
those who would challenge the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
38
(DMCA) on constitutional grounds. If the striking deference that
the Court confers on Congress is here to stay, the focus should be
directed to the legislative stage where concessions may be garnered
to ameliorate the more offensive aspects of the particular bill at
issue. In other words, once the legislation is passed, do not look to
the courts to bail you out. Indeed, the courts have in only one
39
instance declared that a copyright bill was unconstitutional.

B. Eldred and the First Amendment
In my opinion, the First Amendment issue in Eldred ultimately
movement which seeks to move unused copyrighted work into the public domain)
(last visited July 8, 2004). The PDEA would require a copyright holder to pay a $1
renewal fee fifty years after his work is first published, and every ten years after
until the end of the copyright term.
36. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(b) (2000) (defining progressive rate structure for
patent maintenance fees).
37. See William M. Landes & Richard R. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 518 (2003).
38. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. (2000).
39. United Christian Scientists v. Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. 829 F.2d 1152,
1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (invalidating Private Law 92-60, 85 Stat. 857 (1971) on
establishment of religion grounds.)
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may have more impact on the future of copyright law than the
Court’s status quo, inherently deferential reading of Article I. That
said, though the petitioner lost as well on this issue, what Justice
Ginsberg said about the interplay of copyright and the First
Amendment indicates real constraints on the scope of copyright
law.
On the First Amendment issue, the majority agreed with the
government’s position that the “speech-protective purposes and
safeguards” embodied in copyright law were sufficient to preclude
40
any heightened scrutiny of copyright legislation. In that regard,
41
the Court referred to the idea/expression in § 102(b), and § 107’s
42
fair use doctrine as part of the definitional balance that retains a
free marketplace of ideas while protecting the author’s original
expression. In conclusion, the majority declared: “The CTEA . . .
does not oblige anyone to reproduce another’s speech against the
carrier’s will . . . . The First Amendment securely protects the
freedom to make—or decline to make—one’s own speech; it bears
less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people’s
43
speeches.” Thus, copyright’s built-in free speech safeguards are
generally adequate to address them. Significantly, the Court added
that the D.C. Circuit spoke too broadly when it declared copyrights
“categorically immune from challenges under the First
44
Amendment.” “But when, as in this case, Congress has not altered
the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First
45
Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.”
These remarks about the relationship between copyright law
and the First Amendment are apt to have an influence beyond the
narrow issue of term extension. They may be the most important
feature of the Court’s opinion on future developments in copyright
law. When does legislation alter those “traditional contours?” In
this regard, one might refer to the decision in Universal Studios, Inc.
46
v. Corley.
In Corley, the editors of a web site published the
hyperlinks to other web sites making available a program, the socalled DeCSS code, that could be used to crack the motion picture

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218-19.
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
Id. § 107.
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. (citations omitted)
273 F.3d. 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
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47

industry’s DVD anti-copying security software.
In holding that
48
such conduct violated § 1201(c) of the DMCA, the Court of
Appeals deferred to Congress’s authority to enact prohibitions
against making available the means to circumvent technological
measures designed to protect copyrighted works against
49
unauthorized access and use.
It read § 1201(c) of the DMCA
narrowly, holding that the provision preserves fair use in the
context of traditional copyright infringement litigation but not for
50
independent causes of action brought under the DMCA.
The
Court found that the legislation imposed no undue burdens on the
First Amendment interests of individuals who communicate about
51
computer code. Neither the statute nor, as far as I know, the
legislative history addresses the linking issue; nonetheless, the court
interpreted the law to afford full relief against the harms at which
52
the statute was intended.
The Corley court, however, declined
consideration on the record of whether enforcement of the anticircumvention provisions might improperly encumber the “fair
53
use” rights of third parties.
For proponents of a wider public domain, Eldred was a loss at
least for the question of term extension. They will no doubt find
some support in their position from Justice Ginsberg’s statements
regarding the role of fair use in the overall scheme of copyright. I
look for public domain proponents to accelerate their efforts on
this issue.

II. NEW YORK TIMES CO. V. TASINI:
THE MEANING OF MEDIA NEUTRALITY
54

New York Times Co. v. Tasini, decided some two years before
Eldred, spoke to a relatively narrow and technical issue under §
55
This section of the Act allows
201(c) of the Copyright Act.
publishers of “collective works,” such as newspapers and magazines,
the right to republish the material supplied by freelance
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 445-46.
17 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (2000).
Universal Studios, Inc, 273 F.3d at 458.
Id. at 458-59.
Id. at 455.
Id. at 458.
Id. at 458-59.
533 U.S. 483 (2001).
17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2000).
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contributors in “revisions” of those collective works. Even though
Tasini did not receive the universal ballyhoo of Eldred, it is an
important decision because the Court gave its first indication of
how it will apply traditional copyright principles to disputes
involving digital information technologies. The Court rejected the
argument that unforeseen technological developments call for
specifically crafted approaches to interpretations of the Copyright
57
Act.
This litigation was initiated by Tasini and other freelance
writers who contributed articles to the New York Times and other
58
publishers. Under agreements with the periodicals’ publishers,
two computer database companies placed copies of the freelancers’
articles—along with all other articles from the periodicals in which
59
the freelancers’ work appeared—in three databases.
In this
format, the user could retrieve each article individually, clear of the
60
context in which the article appeared in print publication. In
other words, the user entered a search query based on key words,
which would then be retrieved by the search engine.
The question presented was whether a publisher’s
reproduction and distribution of its entire periodical, not only in
print but also electronically, is a privileged revision of a collective
61
work under § 201(c) of the Copyright Act. The Act provides in
part:
In the absence of an express transfer of the
copyright or of any rights under it, the owner of
copyright in the collective work is presumed to have
acquired only the privilege of reproducing and
distributing the contribution as part of that
particular collective work, any revision of that
collective work, and any later collective work in the
62
same series.
Justice Ginsberg, writing for the same 7-2 Eldred majority
(Breyer and Stevens dissenting), rejected the publisher’s argument
63
that databases are analogous to microfilm and microfiche. Unlike
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Tasini, 533 U.S. at 505-06.
Id. at 483.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 487.
17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2000).
Tasini, 533 U.S. at 485-86.
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microforms, the databases at issue did not perceptibly reproduce
articles as part of the collective work to which the author
64
contributed or as part of any revision thereof. Nor was the Court
persuaded by publishers’ reliance on the concept of medianeutrality in contending that transferring a work between media
65
does not alter the character of the work. Unlike the conversion of
newsprint to microfilm, the transfer of articles to the databases is
not a mere conversion of intact periodicals or revisions from one
66
medium to another. Rather, the databases offer users individual
67
articles, not intact periodicals. The Court repeatedly returned to
the way the files are perceived and accessed by end users “[i]n
determining whether the Articles have been reproduced and
distributed ‘as part of’ a ‘revision’ of the collective works in issue,
we focus on the Articles as presented to, and perceptible by, the
68
user of the Databases.”
As to remedy, the Court remanded the case without explicit
69
guidance. The court discounted the publisher’s predictions of
the devastating consequences that would result from an
70
injunction.
Justice Ginsberg concluded “[i]n any event,
speculation about future harms is no basis for this Court to shrink
authorial rights Congress established in § 201(c). Agreeing with
the Court of Appeals that the Publishers are liable for
infringement, we leave remedial issues open for initial airing and
71
decision in the District Court.”
As in Eldred, Justices Stevens and Breyer sharply disagreed with
the majority’s statutory analysis, concluding that the databases were
72
in fact revisions under § 201(c). Justice Stevens reasoned that if a
single edition of the New York Times were stored as ASCII files on a
floppy disk, preserving the “all-important editorial selection,” the
dissent would hold such a collection of files to be a “revision” of
73
that collective work, if not “that collective work” itself. “[A]s long
as each article explicitly refers to the original collective work and as

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id. at 486.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 499.
Id. at 506.
Id. at 504-05.
Id. at 505-06.
Id. at 506. (Stevens & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 514-16.
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long as substantially the rest of the collective work is, at the same
time, readily accessible to the reader of the individual file,” there
should be no difference between a print version and an electronic
74
version of a single daily paper. The dissent retraced the evolution
of § 201(c) from the relevant sections of the 1909 Act, asserting
that the majority decision gave insufficient weight to the public
benefit provided by the databases, and thus “unnecessarily subverts
this fundamental goal of copyright law in favor of a narrow focus
75
on ‘authorial rights.’ ”
The majority’s holding in Tasini is troublesome even though,
from a purely doctrinal standpoint, I agree with the Court’s
interpretation of § 201(c). To hold otherwise would distort the
wording of the statute to achieve a result that would keep the status
quo and not distort the current distribution of articles already
available to consumers. However correct Tasini may be from a
doctrinal standpoint, it has proved to be an unmitigated disaster
76
from a societal standpoint.
At first blush, the Supreme Court’s decision appears to be a
nice victory for freelance journalists. On closer inspection, it
hardly accommodates anyone. One might conclude that the
freelancers won the battle but lost the war. What happened is this:
In the 1990s, with the Tasini case looming, publishers (like the New
York Times Co.) became fully aware of the possible liability risk and
began insisting on “all rights” agreements designed to allow
77
publishers to reuse freelancers’ contributions. The contracts are
standard now, but it is not clear whether freelancers were able to
extract larger profits in negotiating these agreements. After all,
media outlets for freelance articles have continued to consolidate
so that publishers are now virtual oligopolies. The market is now a
buyer’s market: “You want to write an article for us, sign over the
rights.” Thus, the freelancers earned a modest one-time windfall at
best.
If the freelancers earned an ambiguous victory, and the
publishers suffered an ambiguous loss, what about the public
interest in access to information? Here is where the story gets

74. Id. at 514.
75. Id. at 520.
76. See Experts Weigh Tasini Ruling’s Impact on Freelancers and Electronic
Publishing, 62 BNA’S PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 557 (2001) (reporting on
a briefing that discussed Tasini and its consequences).
77. Id.
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depressing. The public appears to have lost unambiguously. In the
aftermath of Tasini, many newspapers and other print media,
uncertain as to which archived articles were written by freelancers,
have resorted to overly inclusive purges to avoid liability.
Consequently, a researcher who wants access to a certain article
may not be able to go online to obtain it and, in turn, is forced to
find a library that keeps paper (or microfiche) copies of the
publication.
So what has Tasini accomplished outside of a reasoned
interpretation of § 201(c) and rather unfortunate practical
78
results? One thing stands out. Tasini is a pro-author decision that
reconfirms the basic policy that individual creation, encouraged by
the incentives of copyright law, benefits the public interest. After
all, it was concern about the unfair situation of periodical
contributors that motivated Congress to structure § 201(c) as it
79
did. Some might take pleasure in the fact that the beneficiaries of
this pro-author attitude were real live creators rather than the
“content providing” corporate entities.
In addition to reaffirming the pro-author basis of § 201, Tasini,
more importantly, articulates a certain attitude in the application
of copyright law to digital issues. In my view, the case stands for
one version of “media neutrality,” the idea that courts should
interpret copyright law in a technologically neutral fashion. In
applying § 201(c), the Court focused on consumers’ perceptions to
determine what constituted a qualifying “revision” of a periodical,
rather than on the technology’s characteristics itself. In so doing, it
rejected the notion that digital issues are somehow different than
others, a position adopted in part by the dissenters. What this
means is that the digital condition is not so overwhelmingly
singular to justify the abrogation of traditional copyright principles.
What does this view of “media neutrality” hold for the future of
copyright law? Although Tasini is an author’s rights case, its
implicit approach to media neutrality might result in applying the
doctrine of fair use in a technologically neutral manner, even
though the user may have accessed a work residing in digital format
78. For an analysis of the legislative history concerning § 201 see William
Patry, New York Times v. Tasini: Call for Common (Not Horse) Sense, 61 BNA’S PATENT
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., No. 602 (2001).
79. Often in United States copyright law the notion of authorship is pressed
into service to benefit corporate entities rather than individual creators. See Peter
Jaszi, Towards a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphosis of “Authorship,” 1991 DUKE L.
J. 455 (1991).
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and despite the argument that such use might cause greater risks to
the copyright owner. To this extent, Tasini’s version of media
neutrality, read in conjunction with Eldred’s reaffirmation of fair use
in its First Amendment discussion, may bode well for advocates of a
more vibrant public domain.
From an immediate standpoint, Tasini has already had an
impact on the development of the law under § 201(c). In Faulkner
80
v. National Geographic Society, the district court for the Southern
District of New York held that the use of freelancers’ photographs
in CD-ROM versions of National Geographic magazine was a
privileged revision of the print publication, not an infringement of
81
the freelancers’ copyright in their contributions.
The Faulkner
82
case runs counter to Greenberg v. National Geographic Society, a preTasini decision, that found no revision privilege in favor of the
magazine under the same facts. The Faulkner court emphasized the
fact that the individual contributions appeared in the same
83
contexts as they did in the original collective work.

III. DASTAR V. TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORP.:
RIGHT OF PATERNITY
One could challenge my characterization of Dastar Corp. v.
84
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. as a copyright case and in some
ways I would agree. After all, Dastar concerns the application of
unfair competition in an unusual context. I include it in my
discussion because it does reflect the interplay between the
Commerce and Copyright clauses of the Constitution, the
protection of moral rights, and more generally, the Court’s current
attitude about the role of public domain.
In 1948, General Dwight D. Eisenhower completed his book,
85
Crusade in Europe, an account of the Allied crusade of Europe.
The publisher, Doubleday, registered the copyright and granted
86
exclusive TV rights to Fox. Fox commissioned Time to produce a

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

294 F. Supp. 2d 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Id. at 544-46.
244 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2001)
Faulkner, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 543.
123 S. Ct. 2041 (2003).
Id. at 2044.
Id.
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TV series, based on the book, which was first broadcast in 1949.
88
Doubleday
Time assigned its copyright in the series to Fox.
89
renewed its copyright in the book.
Fox did not renew its
90
copyright in the TV series, which expired in 1977. In 1988, Fox
reacquired television rights in the book, including the exclusive
91
right to distribute the videos.
It then sublicensed to SFM
Entertainment and New Line Video the right to produce and
92
In 1995, Dastar copied the original TV
distribute a video set.
series, removed the credits, repackaged the set, and released its
93
own video product under the credit “DASTAR CORP presents.”
Fox, SFM, and New Line filed suit alleging copyright infringement
and violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act and state unfair
94
competition law for “reverse passing off.”
The district court
granted summary judgment to Fox on both the copyright and
95
“reverse passing off claim.” It found that Dastar had committed a
“bodily appropriation” by substantially copying the series and
96
The Court of Appeals
selling it without attribution to Fox.
reversed and remanded on the copyright infringement claim, but
97
affirmed the claim for “reverse passing off.” The court found that
Dastar made a “false designation of origin” in violation of
trademark law and the “bodily appropriation test” precluded any
98
need to show consumer confusion.
Some court watchers were intrigued, even surprised, that the
Supreme Court took the case at all. Were the justices looking for a
way to counterbalance the Eldred opinion that the Copyright Term
Extension Act was constitutional? I do not think we should read
too much into this. As fascinating as Dastar is, the case is not based
on the application of the constitutional clause, as Eldred was. It
could have been otherwise. For example, the Court could have
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2044-45.
95. Id. at 2045.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entm’t Distrib., 34 Fed. Appx. 312,
314 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub nom, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., 123 S. Ct. 2041 (2003).
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found that the Commerce Clause cannot be used to circumvent the
Copyright Clause. In the end it took a more modest approach to
the question.
The Court chose instead to base its decision by construing the
99
scope of § 43 of the Lanham Act.
It did so, however, in an
unexpected way. When the court granted certiorari, I thought that
the Court would follow in the footsteps of Moseley v. Victoria’s Secret
100
Catalogue, Inc. and require proof of actual confusion before
sustaining action for reverse confusion. In fact, the opinion is
much more expansive and has ramifications beyond trademark law.
Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, reversed the Court of
Appeals, which held that the Lanham Act does not prevent the
101
unaccredited copying of an uncopyrighted work.
The Court
concluded that the phrase “origin of goods” in the Lanham Act
“refers to the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for
sale, and not to the author of any idea, concept, or communication
embodied in those goods . . . . To hold otherwise would be akin to
finding that § 43(a) created a species of perpetual patent and
102
copyright, which Congress may not do.”
The Court based its rationale on the difference between the
standard definitions of “goods” and “origins” and determined that
those terms did not cover the underlying intellectual property or its
103
creators. By contrast, the action could be sustained if Dastar had
bought some of New Line’s Crusade videotapes and merely
104
repackaged them as its own.
Instead Dastar took a creative work
in the public domain, copied it, made modifications, and produced
105
its own series of videotapes.
Thus, Dastar was the origin of the
physical products it sold as its own, and as such, the respondents
106
could not prevail on its Lanham Act claims.
The question is: What constitutes “origin”? Does it refer to the
manufacturer or the producer of physical goods, or does it refer to
the creator of the underlying work? The Court concluded that

99. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000).
100. 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
101. Dastar Corp., 123 S. Ct. at 2041. Justice Breyer took no part in either
consideration or decision of the case.
102. Id. at 2050 (citing Eldred, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003)).
103. Id. at 2049-50.
104. Id. at 2050.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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“origin” refers to the former.
Consumers who buy brand-name
products do not automatically assume that the brand-name
company is the entity that came up with or designed the product.
In general, consumers do not care what entity designed the
product they are purchasing. In other words, consumers may care
who manufactured the product, but do not care who created it. To
conclude otherwise, the Court asserted, would cause a conflict with
copyright law, which grants the public the right to copy without
108
attribution once a copyright has expired.
I personally take issue with Justice Scalia’s conclusion as to
what purchasers care about when it comes to the origin of goods.
As for myself, I am particularly interested in knowing the author’s
name and I suspect many others hold a similar view. I do not agree
that a § 43(a) right of paternity in the appropriate circumstance
after the expiration of copyright would create an inherent conflict
with copyright law. Such a rule would not prevent copying of the
copyrighted work with impunity. Thus, I fail to see how the
requirement to acknowledge authorship would be that onerous
and would improperly extend copyright.
Justice Scalia also asserted that the § 43(a) cause of action
would conflict with copyright law in another way. He reasoned that
Congress has already created a specific paternity right in the Visual
Artists Rights Act (VARA) codified in § 106A of the Copyright
109
Act.
VARA provides the author of a qualifying artistic work the
110
Justice Scalia pointed
right “to claim authorship of that work.”
out the VARA paternity right is much more focused than a more
111
generalized right under the Lanham Act.
Thus, to recognize “a
cause of action for misrepresentation of authorship of
noncopyrighted works (visual or otherwise) would render these
112
limitations superfluous.”
This is a striking statement for two reasons. One is factual. I
fail to see how a more generalized right of paternity under federal
unfair competition law would render VARA superfluous. Certainly,
Congress gave no indication that VARA was intended to supersede
the protection of paternity interests upheld in the application of

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 2049-50.
Id. at 2050.
Id. at 2048.
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A) (2000).
Dastar, 123 S. Ct. at 2048.
Id.
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§ 43(a). Second, and more importantly, the statement seems to
give short shrift to United States obligations under the Berne
Convention requiring that authors be provided the rights of
113
paternity and integrity.
Did the Court forget that the
requirement of moral rights protections was a major obstacle for
United States participation in the Berne Convention? For the
United States, the moral rights issue was, to put it mildly, an
inconvenient aspect of Berne. At the time of the passage of the
Berne Convention Implementation Act, it was generally recognized
that the passage of a full-fledged moral rights provision in the
copyright law would have been a political impossibility. Thus, the
United States, to save face, took a minimalist position on moral
rights. In other words, it skirted the issue, maintaining that the
entirety of United States law including unfair competition,
defamation, privacy, and contract, in addition to copyright law,
114
provided effective protection of moral rights.
Dastar goes far in
undermining whatever illusion is left of the minimalist argument.
In addition to ignoring the Berne requirements, Dastar also
avoided an important and controversial issue concerning legislative
authority in the field of intellectual property law. Can the Congress
evade constraints placed on it by the Copyright Clause by basing a
statutory enactment in another grant of power, such as the
Commerce Clause? This issue has particular importance in debates
115
over the proposed sui generis database protection legislation.
Database owners assert that they need such legislation to protect
their investment in the development of their informational
product, particularly in the digital environment. The pervasive
question is whether such sui generis legislation is constitutional in
116
light of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., which
precluded copyright protection for facts per se, irrespective of the
amount of effort made generating or assembling them. Under
Feist, a database is protectable only to the extent that it manifests
117
originality as to its selection and arrangement.
113. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works as
revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 (Paris Act), art. 6bis, available at
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo001en.htm (last visited July 8, 2004).
114. The Berne Implementation Act of 1988 § 2(3), Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102
Stat. 2853 (1988).
115. See, e.g., The Databases and Collections of Information Misappropriations
Act, H.R. 3261(introduced Oct. 8, 2003).
116. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
117. Id. at 363-64.
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Some might view the Court’s holding that the Lanham
Trademark Act could not override the durational limitation
expressed in the Copyright Clause as answering in the negative the
question whether legislation, designed to avoid the constitutionally
mandated requirement of originality declared in its landmark Feist
case, can constitutionally be enacted under the Commerce Clause.
My guess is that the Court did not have this in mind when it issued
its opinion. But Dastar will no doubt provide some ammunition to
public domain advocates who would find the data proposals lacking
in validity from a constitutional standpoint.

IV. CONCLUSION
In my opinion, the Court’s record on its millennium copyright
decisions is mixed. As for Eldred, while the term extension may be
bad from a policy standpoint, I relate to Justice Ginsberg’s careful
and thoughtful opinion despite what some might view as its
excessive deference to the Congress on the issue. And perhaps
more important for the future of copyright is the Court’s
reaffirmation that the fair use doctrine enables copyright to pass
muster under the First Amendment.
Similarly for Tasini, the Court got it right from a doctrinal
standpoint, even though the ultimate result of the holding led to
some unfortunate results in the information marketplace. On the
other hand, public domain advocates may take heart in the Court’s
refusal to adopt a position of “digital exceptionalism.” Thus, when
the time comes to apply the doctrine of fair use in the appropriate
case, anti-DMCA forces may be pleasantly surprised and take
sustenance from the view expressed that just because you call
something “digital,” that does not rule out the traditional
limitations and balances embedded in copyright law. Finally, I
agree with the holding in Dastar but find its rationale less
appealing.
What does all this mean for public domain advocates? Only
time will tell. But I will say this, particularly to those who
optimistically believed that the Court was poised to overturn the
term extension: The future may be grey, but it is certainly not
black. Indeed, in their own quirky way, Eldred, Tasini, and Dastar
may prove to be the key in reaffirming the traditional checks and
balances of copyright law.

